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NOTE
LIGHTS DIM FOR DOMESTIC URANIUM PRODUCERS
Nuclear Energy-Department of Energy's failure to impose re-
strictions on enrichment of foreign source uranium was not a
violation of the statutory language of section 161(v) of the Atomic
Energy Act, where imposition of restrictions would have no im-
pact on the return to viability of the domestic uranium mining
and milling industry. Huffman v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 108
S.Ct. 2087 (1988).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In June 1988, a unanimous United States Supreme Court issued a
decision which will have a fundamental and devastating effect on the
ability of the domestic uranium mining and milling industry to return to
a competitive position in the marketplace.'
Under section 161 (v) of the Atomic Energy Act of 19542 the Department
of Energy (DOE) sells all uranium enrichment services to electric utilities
that require enriched uranium as reactor fuel.3 The statute requires, how-
ever, that DOE shall restrict its enrichment of foreign-source uranium for
domestic use "to the extent necessary to assure the maintenance of a
viable domestic uranium industry." 4 DOE determined in 1984, that the
domestic industry was not viable and that imposition of restrictions on
the enrichment of foreign uranium would not make it viable.'
Prior to that finding, three domestic mining and milling companies
brought suit against DOE, and some of its officers, in the United States
District Court for the District of Colorado. The domestic producers moved
for summary judgment on the theory that DOE's preceding failure to
restrict enrichment of foreign source uranium, and the conceded non-
viability of the domestic producers, was a sufficient nexus to establish
judgment requiring restrictions under section 161 (v) of the Atomic Energy
Act. 6
The district court granted summary judgment to Western Nuclear on
the question of the legality of continued unrestricted foreign uranium
1. Huffman v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 2087 (1988).
2. Atomic Energy Act of 1954 § 161(v), 42 U.S.C. § 2201(v)(A) (1982). This section provides:
[That the DOE] enter into contracts with persons licenced under... this title for such
periods of time as the Commission may deem necessary or desirable to provide, after
December 31, 1968, for the producing or enriching of special nuclear material in facilities
owned by the Commission.
3. See infra note 18.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2201(v)(B)(ii).
5. Western Nuclear, Inc. v. Huffman, 825 F,2d 1430, 1433 (10th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 108 S.Ct.
2087 (1988). See also Dep't. of Energy, 1987 Uranium Enrichment Annual Report 28 (1987).
6. 825 F.2d at 1432. See infra note 23.
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enrichment.' The court determined that immediate injunctive relief was
necessary and entered an order requiring that DOE limit enrichment of
foreign uranium intended for domestic use to 25 percent of all material
enriched during the period June 6 to December 31, 1986, followed by a
complete ban on any foreign enrichment on January 1, 1987, "continuing
until the viability of the domestic uranium industry is assured."' DOE
appealed the ruling to the Tenth Circuit. The appeals court affirmed the
lower court's judgment on the issue of the interpretation of section 161(v).9
Granting DOE's petition for certiorari, a unanimous United States
Supreme Court reversed the lower court on the narrow issue of statutory
construction of the language of section 161(v). " The sole question pre-
sented to the Court was whether section 161(v) required DOE to restrict
enrichment of foreign uranium whenever domestic uranium production
was not viable." The Court concluded that non-viability alone did not
trigger DOE's obligation to restrict foreign enrichment, leaving the more
critical issue-whether DOE had actually violated section 161 (v) in failing
to impose restrictions when the industry first sought relief-to be ad-
dressed on remand.' 2
THE EVOLUTION OF SECTION 161(v)
OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT
Commercial development of domestic uranium resources has been closely
tied to government regulation since the establishment of the Atomic En-
ergy Commission (AEC) in 1946. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 ex-
panded the original Act, providing the comprehensive regulatory structure
7. 825 F.2d at 1432.
8. 108 S.Ct. at 2091.
9. 825 F2d at 1440. The Circuit Judge (McKay) held that:
Plaintiffs' claim that section 2201(v) unambiguously requires that DOE implement re-
strictions on enrichment of foreign uranium when the domestic industry is not viable is
correct. The DOE has not implemented such restrictions and, thus, the district court's
decision granting plaintiff injunctive relief was correct and should be affirmed.
10. 108 SCt. 2087, 2092 (1988).
DOE is required to impose restrictions to the extent necessary to serve a particular
goal, and if no extent will serve that goal, the DOE does not violate the statute by
declining to impose restrictions. Indeed, DOE suggests, to impose restrictions it knew
were incapable of serving the statutory goal would, in fact, be outside its authority.
DOE's reading strikes us as the more natural one.
Id. at 2092. See also Dep't. of Energy, 1987 Uranium Enrichment Annual Report 28 (1987).
I1. 108 S.Ct. at 2088. See also Dep't of Energy, 1987 Uranium Enrichment Annual Report 28
(1987).
12. 108 S.Ct. at 2093 n.l ;
All we have resolved here is that the industry's nonviability does not necessarily trigger
an obligation to impose enrichment resrictions. Whether DOE, in fact, has violated
§ 161(v) by failing to impose restrictions is a question to be addressed, in the first
instance, on remand after an opportunity for presentation of further evidence and further
briefing.
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for managing the developing U.S. nuclear industry. 3 The relationship
between the producers and the government, established originally for
national security reasons, has persisted largely because the AEC and its
successors, the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA),
and the DOE, have remained the sole domestic source for uranium en-
richment services. 4
As initially enacted, the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 allowed private
domestic uranium mining, but limited the sale of uranium exclusively to
the U.S. Government. 5 Amendments to the Act in 1954 permitted, for
the first time, private ownership of nuclear reactors as well as private
lease of government owned and supplied nuclear fuels.' 6 Further imend-
ments in 1964 added section 161(v),'" which addressed how the govern-
ment would provide and charge for enrichment services'" to private
customers.
13. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §2201-2296 (1982). See also C. Allardice and E.
Trapnell, The Atomic Energy Commission (1974).
Effective federal control of atomic energy activities is provided in the organic atomic
energy law by vesting the government with
power (I) to restrict the possession, use, or transfer of those materials vitally important
to or involved in the field either by reason of national security or public health and
safety; (2) to control the building, possession, use, and transfer of facilities for pro-
duction or utilization of atomic energy or particularly sensitive materials that, in the
law, are designated special nuclear materials; and (3) to determine what knowledge
must be kept secret and under what circumstances that knowledge can be disseminated
or used. . . . The law authorizes the commission to establish health and safety regu-
lations, to enter into agreements with the states for the enforcement and implementation
of these regulations, and to use itself or compel the licensing of patents obtained by
others in the field of Atomic energy.
id. at 46.
14. Montagne, The Federal Uranium Enrichment Program and the Criteria and Full Cost Re-
covery Requirements of Section 161(v) of the Atomic Energy Act, 2 J. Min. L. & Pol'y, 2-3 (1986).
The Atomic Energy Commission was established by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946,
60 Stat. 755 (1946), and was re-constituted under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 24
U.S.C. § 2011 (1973). The Atomic Energy Commission was abolished by the Energy
Reorganization Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93438, 88 Stat. 1233 (1974), and the AEC's
uranium enrichment activities were transferred to the newly formed Energy Research
and Development Administration (ERDA). 42 U.S.C. §§5812 & 5814(c) (1983).
ERDA was abolished and its functions transferred to the DOE by the DOE Organization
Act of 1977, 42 U.S.C. §7151(a) (1977).
Id. at 3, nn.4-5.
15. Western Nuclear, Inc. v. Huffman, 825 F2d 1430, 1432 (10th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 108 S.Ct.
2087 (1988). See also Proposed Uranium Enrichment Services Criteria 51 Fed. Reg. 3624, 3625
(1986) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. Pt. 762).
16. Private Ownership of Special Nuclear Materials Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88489 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. § 2013 (1982). See also 825 F.2d at 1432.
17. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2201(v) (1982).
18. See generally G. Davis, Radiation and Life (1970). Uranium-235 is the fuel used in reactors.
Naturally occurring uranium is comprised of approximately 0.72% U-235, the rest being mainly U-
238. Enrichment involves separating most (approx. 90%) of the U-235 from the U-238. Chemical
separation is impossible as both U-235 and U-238 have identical chemical properties (i.e. identical
electron orbits), the difference being that U-238 has 3 more neutrons in its nucleus giving it a greater
mass. Separation requires taking advantage of the difference in mass through a process of diffusion
of a uranium gas through a porous material. The process involves combining natural fluoride with
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Section 161(v) resulted from a series of congressional hearings which
identifed a number of important policy questions related to the Atomic
Energy Act, one of which was whether or not some restrictions should
be imposed on the importation of foreign uranium for enrichment and
sale on the U.S. domestic market. 9 Because of the cost of its domestic
uranium procurement program, the AEC was anxious to allow private
utilities to deal directly with the mining concerns for ore procurement to
be enriched in AEC facilities. The question of allowing foreign source
uranium procurement was first raised as a result of this desire." Ulti-
mately, however, the change in policy resulted from the growing economic
competitiveness of nuclear power with fossil fuels. A continued govern-
ment monopoly was viewed as a limitation on the economic development
of nuclear power,2 but a totally unregulated market was not desirable
either. Domestic producers expressed concern in congressional testimony
that they might fall victim to dumping of cheap foreign uranium, or that
periods of low demand from nuclear utilities would be insufficient to
sustain both the U.S. producers and foreign suppliers if restrictions were
not imposed.22 Responding to their concerns, Congress added to section
161(v) the requirement:
that the commission, to the extent necessary to assure the mainte-
nance of a viable domestic uranium industry, shall not offer such
[enrichment] services for source or special nuclear materials of for-
eign origin intended for use in a utilization facility within or under
the jurisdiction of the United States. The Commission shall establish
criteria in writing setting forth the terms and conditions under which
services provided under this subsection shall be made available for
source or special nuclear material of foreign origin intended for use
in a utilization facility within or under the jurisdiction of the United
States. 23
In order to protect and guarantee the strength of the fledgling domestic
uranium industry, the AEC at that time (1966) decided to enrich no foreign
source uranium for domestic use. 4
the raw uranium to form uranium hexafluoride. This compound is solid at room temperature, but
easily vaporizes when heated. When vaporized, each gas molecule will contain a single U-235 or
U-238 atom. In effect, 0.72% of the molecules have a U-235 atom, the rest U-238. In this gaseous
state, the molecules containing the lighter U-235 atoms will diffuse more rapidly through a porous
filter than the heavier U-238 molecules. The gain in enriched U-235 in each diffusion is very small
(.0014% of the total U-235). so achieving a 90% enrichment of U-235 requires approximately 3,450
diffusions. Id. at 179-81.
19. See generally Montagne, supra note 14, at 12.
20. Id. at 13.
21. See generally U.S. Atomic Energy Comm'n, Annual Report to Congress 23 (1974).
22. Id.
23. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982). See also 51 Fed. Reg. 3,626 (1986).
24. Atomic Energy Commission, Uranium Enrichment Services, Criteria, 31 Fed. Reg. 16,479
(1966).
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Anticipating a continued rapid growth in the domestic uranium industry,
the AEC in 1974 revised its previous enrichment limitation to allow the
gradual phase out of all restrictions on the amount of foreign uranium
permitted to be enriched by the government for domestic consumption.'
Enriched foreign uranium which was to be used in the United States
would be limited to a set percentage for each end user, increasing from
10 percent to 100 percent over the 1977-1984 time frame. Restrictions
were completely lifted on all enrichment services provided to foreign
origin uranium producers where the enriched uranium would not be used
in the United States.26
At the time, this provision was of little consequence to either the AEC
or the domestic mining and milling industry, as demand was greater than
supply and domestic producers perceived no threat from foreign sources.27
Unfortunately, the boom did not continue into the 1980s. A number of
factors, including reduced demand for electricity, higher costs for capital
expenditures, delays in construction of new nuclear facilities, Nuclear
Regulatory Commission licensing deferrals, and heightened concerns about
nuclear power in general, contributed to a rapid decline in domestic
demand for enriched uranium.2"
As a result, private producers were left with huge unmarketable stock-
piles of nuclear fuel.29 The inventories had increased because production,
based on long term contracts, was much greater than demand in the
declining market." In addition, the increasing percentage of foreign ura-
nium allowed to be enriched for domestic consumption had peaked, and
by 1984, the United States had essentially become a member of an in-
ternational free market for uranium.3 This combination of uranium ov-
ersupply, decreasing demand, and low cost foreign uranium resulted in
the drop in prices for domestic ore from $43.70 per pound in 1979 to a
low of $14.45 per pound in 1986.32 The sharp decline in prices had a
25. Foreign Uranium for Domestic Use, Modification of Restriction on Enrichment, 39 Fed. Reg.
38,016 (1974).
26. Id.
(a) 10 percent at any time during 1977; (b) 15 percent at any time during 1978; (c)
20 percent at any time during 1979; (d) 30 percent at any time during 1980; (e) 40
percent at any time during 1981; (f) 60 percent at any time during 1982; (g) 80 percent
at any time during 1983. Thereafter, there shall be no restriction on the furnishing of
feed material of foreign origin for the provision of enrichment services.
Id. at 38,017.
27. Western Nuclear, Inc. v. Huffman, 825 F.2d 1430, 1432 (10th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 108 S.Ct.
2087 (1988).
28. Proposed Uranium Enrichment Services Criteria, 51 Fed. Reg. 3,625 (1986) (to be codified
at 10 C.F.R. Pt. 762).
29. 825 F.2d at 1433.
30. See Energy Information Administration, Domestic Uranium Mining and Milling Industry,
Viability Assessment 5-6 (1986).
31. Id.
32. Id.
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concurrent negative effect on employment in the domestic industry. From
a high of 21,951 employees engaged in exploration, mining, and milling
in 1979, the total in 1986 had declined to 2,120, a figure 90 percent
lower than 1979.33
Just as significantly, the average daily feed of raw uranium ore to mills
in 1986 was 3,740 tons a day, which represented only 9 percent of the
total domestic milling capacity.34 This contrasts with the 77 percent use
of mill capacity in 1981, when the domestic suppliers first requested DOE
to restrict foreign source enrichment. Also during this period, the number
of operating uranium mills in the United States declined from 20 to 6. 3-
These trends were graphically reflected in expenditures for uranium ex-
ploration and development. In 1978, for example, $314 million were
spent domestically for surface drilling, land acquisition, and other costs
related to geologic and geophysical investigations and research.36 By
1986, these same expenditures industry-wide totalled just over $22 mil-
lion.37
Compounding the problem, DOE had also by this time lost its enrich-
ment monopoly on foreign commercial fuels to two European government
consortiums and the Soviet Union.3" In fact, by the early 1980s, DOE
had become the highest priced primary supplier of enrichment services
in the world.39 As a consequence, DOE was not only losing fees from
domestic producers seeking cheaper enrichment services elsewhere, but
also losing foreign source customers to less expensive foreign enrichmentfacilities.' °
Faced with rapidly declining revenues from enrichment services, DOE
in 1983 adopted several major initiatives in an effort to return the United
States to a competitive position in the world enrichment market. Among
the initiatives, DOE implemented a variable tails option for enrichment
33. Energy Information Administration, Uranium Industry Annual 46 (1986). The employment
figures for 1979-86 contrast sharply with those from 1967 (following imposition of restrictions on
foreign uranium) to 1978 (where the effect of lifted restrictions was beginning to be felt) when the
total industry employment grew from 6,751 workers to 20,840. Id.
34. Id. at 47.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 14.
37. Id.
38. Huffman v. Western Nuclear, Inc. 108 S.Ct. at 2087, 2089 (1988). 51 Fed. Reg. 3,625 (1986).
See also Montagne, The Federal Uranium Enrichment Program and the Criteria and Full Cost
Recovery Requirements of Section 161(v) of theAtomic EnergyAct, 2 J. of Min. L. & Pol'y 5 (1986).
DOE currently has three competitors, all government owned .... The first is Eurodif,
over 50% owned by France, and the remainder by Spain, Italy, Belgium, and Iran....
The second is Urenco, owned by West Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Neth-
erlands .... The third is Techsnabexport, owned by the Soviet Union.
Id. at 5-6 n.12.
39. Proposed Uranium Enrichment Services Criteria, 51 Fed. Reg. 3,625 (1986) (to be codified
at 10 C.F.R. Pt. 762).
40. Western Nuclear Inc. v. Huffman, 825 F.2d at 1432 (10th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 108 S.Ct. 2087
(1988).
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services to attract customers away from foreign competition.4' In effect,
DOE allowed tails42 from already enriched uranium, but still containing
low quantities of usable material, to be mixed with natural uranium prior
to enrichment. This process allowed a greater amount of enriched uranium
to be produced from less natural uranium.43 The net effect was that DOE
enrichment costs declined as users now had an option of buying either
more natural uranium, requiring less enrichment, or less uranium, mixed
with tails, requiring more enrichment, based on the most attractive market
conditions at the time." The variable tails option, however, accelerated
the decline in demand for higher priced domestic uranium."'
Responding to the increasing plight of domestic uranium producers,
Congress in 1983 again amended the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 by
adding section 170B (42 U.S.C. §2201), which required the Secretary
of Energy to make an annual determination of the viability of the domestic
mining and milling industry for the years 1983 to 1992.' The amendment
required that the Secretary, within nine months of enactment, establish
by rulemaking the criteria for making the annual determination.' These
criteria, still in effect today, defined viability as "the extent to which the
domestic mining and milling uranium industry will be capable, at any
particular time, of supplying the needs of the domestic nuclear power
industry under a variety of hypothetical conditions." 4 This measure in-
volved four major attributes of viability: resource capability; supply re-
sponse capability; financial capability; and import commitment dependency.' 9
41. Id. at 1433.
42. Tails (depleted uranium) consist of uranium having a smaller percentage of U-235 than the
0.7% found in natural uranium. Tails are obtained either from spent fuel elements, or as a by-product
of the uranium enrichment process. Nuclear Terms, a Brief Glossary, U.S. Atomic Energy Comm'n,
14 (2d ed.).
43. See Ill U.S. Dep't of Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and Civilian Nuclear Power, Report of
the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program: Resources and Fuel Cycle Facilities
(1980). An estimated 19,000 short tons of U-238 was contained in mill tailings in 1977. This quantity
was expected to increase with future milling operations. Because of the uranium grades and metal-
lurgical characteristics of these tailings, it was estimated that, at most, 40 percent of the uranium
content could be recovered. The estimated cost for recovery in 1979 was $60 per pound. Annual
production was estimated by DOE to be reached in the late 1990s and to continue to 2010, when
the last of the mill tailings will have been processed. Id. at 35.
44. 825 F.2d at 1433.
45. Id.
46. Criteria to Assess Viability of Domestic Uranium Mining and Milling Industry, 48 Fed. Reg.
45,746 (1983) (codified at 10 C.F.R. Pt. 761).
47. Id.
48. 48 Fed. Reg. 45,747 (1983).
49. Id.
The fundamental criteria which define the four attributes are the following: i) Resource
Capability: Whether domestic economic uranium reserves can supply all domestic
needs for a future ten-year period; 2) Supply Response Capability: The level of domestic
uranium production capacity sufficient to meet projected domestic nuclear power needs
for a ten-year period; 3) Financial Capability: The ability of the domestic uranium
industry to obtain funds adequate to finance the level of production capability defined
under supply response capability; 4) Import Commitment Dependency: Whether ex-
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The viability criteria were based on the assumption that a viable domestic
uranium industry was one which could meet domestic demands under a
variety of eventualities, including a disruption of foreign uranium sup-
plies.s' Following promulgation of these criteria, DOE reported that the
industry was viable in 1983 but was not in 1984."'
In 1983, after implementation of the variable tails option, a number
of domestic mining and milling companies requested that DOE implement
restrictions on enrichment of foreign uranium required by section 161 (v). "
DOE initially refused because it found the domestic industry viable and
thus that section 161(v) was not applicable.53 After finding that the in-
dustry was not viable in 1984 or in 1985, DOE still refused to impose
ecuted contracts or options for source material or special nuclear material will result
in greater than 371/2 percent of actual or projected domestic uranium requirements for
any two-consecutive-year period being supplied by source material or special nuclear
material from foreign sources.
Id.
50. Energy Information Administration, Domestic Uranium Mining and Milling Industry, Viability
Assessment 2 (1986).
51. Proposed Uranium Enrichment Services Criteria, 51 Fed. Reg. 3,627 (1986) (to be codified
at 10 C.F.R. Pt. 762). In his review, the Secretary was required to make:
(1) an assessment of whether executed contracts or options for source material or
special nuclear material will result in greater than 37'/2 percent of actual or projected
domestic uranium requirements for any two-consecutive-year period being supplied
by source material or special nuclear material from foreign sources; (2) projections of
uranium requirements and inventories of domestic utilities for a 10-year period; (3)
present and probable future uses of the domestic market by foreign imports; (4) whether
domestic economic reserves can supply all future needs for a future 10-year period;(5) present and projected domestic uranium exploration expenditures and plans; (6)
present and projected employment and capital investment in the uranium industry; (7)
the level of domestic uranium production capacity sufficient to meet projected domestic
nuclear power needs for a 10 year period; and (8) a projection of domestic uranium
production and uranium price levels which will be in effect under various assumptions
with respect to imports.
48 Fed. Reg. 45,749 (1983).
52. 51 Fed. Reg. at 3,626.
53. Id. See also Montagne, supra note 14, at 17 n. 71.
Based on optimistic forecasts of expanding demand for nuclear power and, conse-
quently, uranium. . . the AEC in 1974 adopted new criteria phasing out the limitations
during the period 1978-83. As noted, the optimistic projections did.not come to pass.
The domestic uranium industry began to appeal for relief in 1981. . . . Despite several
requests from domestic producers to reimpose enrichment limitations under section
161v, the Department of Energy (now in charge of implementation of section 161v
has declined. At first, the principle grounds for refusal was simply the domestic uranium
industry was 'viable.' However, as of September 26, 1985, DOE declared that the
domestic uranium industry was in fact not viable in calander year 1984. DOE never-
theless has declined to reimplement section 161v .... One of the rationales offered
by DOE for its refusal to act is that reimposition of enrichment limitations would be
circumvented in that utilities would go abroad for enrichment services. The federal
government now takes the position that it lacks authority under the Atomic Energy
Act to prevent this kind of circumvention through the licencing process.
[Vol. 29
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restrictions under section 161(v) stating that restrictions would not make
the domestic industry viable.' Following the first report of non-viability,
the Secretary of Energy in 1985, stated that:
DOE does not believe this determination, standing alone, either au-
thorizes or requires imposing restrictions on the enrichment of feed
material of foreign origin under § 161(v) of the Atomic Energy Act.
Instead, it indicates that DOE should continue its analysis by con-
sidering, in the words of the statute, 'the extent' to which restricting
enrichment of foreign source material for domestic end use will, in
fact, 'assure the maintenance of a viable domestic uranium industry.'
DOE's preliminary view is that restrictions would not assist the
domestic mining and milling industry in any meaningful way."
Shortly thereafter, DOE again initiated rulemaking to consider revising
the criteria used in DOE's offering of enrichment services. Recognizing
the depressed condition of the U.S. domestic industry, the Secretary of
Energy nevertheless decided not to restrict foreign source enrichment
because "[i]mport restrictions on foreign uranium would not assure the
viability of the domestic mining and milling industry." 6 His rationale
was based on the observation that the difficulties facing the domestic
mining and milling industry resulted from more than the difference in
cost between foreign and domestic ore. He found that non-viability also
resulted from declining demand for nuclear power, excess uranium in-
ventories, excess production capacity, and cancellation of powerplants 7
After receiving extensive comments to the contrary, the revised criteria
again failed to include restrictions on foreign source enrichment.5 8 In fact,
the new criteria specifically stated that "DOE may not restrict the en-
richment of uranium of foreign origin for domestic use except to the
extent it determines such a restriction is necessary to assure the main-
tenance of a viable domestic uranium industry."59 Explaining the lack of
restrictions in view of comments received from the domestic uranium
industry, the Secretary responded that "[tihe plain language of the statute
makes clear that restrictions are not to be imposed automatically if the
domestic mining industry is non-viable, but only if they are needed to,
and in fact, will assure the maintenance of a viable domestic uranium
industry.
54. Western Nuclear, Inc. v. Huffman, 825 F2d 1430, 1433 (10th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 108 S.Ct.
2087 (1988).
55. 51 Fed. Reg. at 3,627 (emphasis added).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Uranium Enrichment Services Criteria, 10 C.FR. §762.3 (1986).
59. Id.
60. 51 Fed. Reg. 27,134 (1986).
Fall 1989)
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ANALYSIS
Huffman, and the issues it raises, will have important consequences
for domestic utilities using nuclear power and for consumers of such
power.
61
The domestic uranium mining and milling industry was a very real
creation of the U.S. Government. Until the 1964 amendment to the
Atomic Energy Act allowing for private ownership of nuclear fuels, the
government monopoly was complete. 2 As a consequence of government
control, the development of the industry was inextricably linked to the
regulatory structure dictated by the Atomic Energy Act. Congress rec-
ognized this unusual dependency in its finding that "[tihe processing and
utilization of source, byproduct, and special nuclear materials must be
regulated in the national interest and in order to provide for the common
defense and security and to protect the health and safety of the public."'63
More significantly, the legislative history of the enactment of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 expressly recognized the need for close government
and private cooperation in the development of nuclear energy where the
committee report stated:
We do not believe that the efforts of free enterprise, using its own
resources and moneys, are by themselves adequate to achieve the
speediest possible attack on the goal of peacetime power. Neither
do we believe that maximum progress toward this objective will be
afforded by an effort relying exclusively on governmental research
and development, using the public's moneys. We believe, rather,
that teamwork between Government and industry-teamwork of the
type encouraged by these amendments-is the key to optimum prog-
ress, efficiency, and economy in this area of atomic endeavor."
In Huffman, the Court failed to adequately consider the context of the
legislative history preceding Congress's adoption of section 161(v), ex-
amining only the issue of whether "DOE must impose restriction on the
enrichment of foreign-source uranium whenever the domestic industry is
determined not to be viable."
65
While the Court agreed that the legislative history supported congres-
sional intent to maintain a viable domestic mining and milling industry,
it refused to accept Western Nuclear's position that the statutory language
61. Western Nuclear, Inc. v. Huffman, 825 F.2d 1430, 1432 (10th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 108 S.Ct.
2087 (1988).
62. Private Ownership of Special Nuclear Materials Act, Pub. L. No. 88-489, 42 U.S.C. § 2201-
2296 (1954) (codified as amended at §2013) (1964). See also S. Rep. No. 1699, 83rd Cong., 2d
Sess., reprinted in 1954 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3456, 3463.
63. Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. §2012(d) (1954).
64. S. Rep. No. 1699, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1954 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News 3456, 3464.
65. Huffman v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 108 S.Ct. 2087, 2091.
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indicated that Congress made a policy determination that timely impo-
sition of restrictions on the enrichment of foreign source uranium would
always assure the viability of the domestic industry. This would mandate
DOE impose source restrictions whenever the industry's viability was
threatened or destroyed.'
Instead, the Court reversed the lower court, adopting DOE's argument
that, "DOE is required to impose restrictions to the extent necessary to
serve a particular goal, and if no extent will serve that goal, then DOE
does not violate the statute by declining to impose restrictions." '67 In
reaching that conclusion, the Court reasoned that if complete restriction
would not assure a viable domestic industry, then Congress could not
have intended restrictions be imposed where the purpose of the statute
was unattainable."
The narrow position adopted by the Supreme Court was consistent with
recent trends deferring to agency interpretation of statutes under agency
administration," but failed to adequately address the underlying issue of
how far the government should retreat from protecting vulnerable do-
mestic uranium producers from market forces beyond their control. In
reversing the lower court, the Supreme Court at once upheld the deference
to agency interpretation of statutes it enforces, while ignoring its own
recent pronouncement in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council.7'
In Chevron, the Court found that on questions of statutory interpretation,
it: "must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear
Congressional intent. If a court . . . ascertains that Congress had an
intention on the precise questions at issue, that intention is the law and
must be given effect."71
The Court's analysis is strained in focusing only on the semantics of
the statutory construction of section 161(v) to the exclusion of the un-
derlying purpose of the statute. The case's larger dimension rests squarely
66. Id. at 2092.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 2092-93.
69. See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984), where the
Court explained:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it administers, it
is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that
is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Con-
gress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply
impose its own construction on the statute as would be necessary in the absence of an
administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect
to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based
on a permissible construction of the statute.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 843, n. 9 (emphasis added).
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on determining to what extent Congress thought regulation necessary "to
assure the maintenance of" the domestic industry.72
In its report to Congress, prior to enactment of section 161(v), the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy recognized the importance and ne-
cessity of a viable domestic uranium industry. The Committee report
stated, "[tihe maintenance of a viable domestic uranium mining and
milling industry is an essential part of a sound nuclear industry and is
also vital to the long-range defense and security interests of the United
States." 3 The Committee specifically considered how "maintenance"
should be ensured and concluded that foreign enrichment should only be
allowed when the domestic industry is viable:
importation could have a serious impact on the uranium mining and
milling industry, particularly during a period of limited demand for
its product. Accordingly, the flexible restriction contained in the
committee bill will allow the [DOE] to review periodically the con-
dition of the domestic and world uranium markets and to offer en-
richment services on a basis which will assure, in its opinion, the
maintenance of a viable domestic uranium mining and milling in-
dustry.74
The legislative history of section 161(v) overwhelmingly supports the
conclusion that Congress enacted the statute to insure that DOE maintain
a viable domestic uranium industry.7"
CONCLUSION
The Huffman Court's holding that a non-viable industry requires no
statutory protection under the Atomic Energy Act raises the fundamental
question of whether or not the industry can ever recover without protection
against foreign competitors. In skirting the broad legislative intent of
Congress in enacting section 161 (v), the Supreme Court effectively sealed
the fate of the domestic uranium producers for the foreseeable future.
The Court's narrow focus, ruling only on the challenge to the entry of
summary judgment by the court below, restricted the lower court's inquiry
on remand solely to the issue of whether DOE in fact violated section
161(v) by failing to impose restrictions on foreign uranium enrichment.76
This will do nothing to revive the industry. While conceded that restric-
72. Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. §2201(v) (1982) (emphasis added).
73. S. Rep. No. 1325, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 3105, 3115, reprinted in 1964 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 3105, 3115.
74. 1964 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3120.
75. This was also the conclusion of the Tenth Circuit. Western Nuclear, Inc. v. Huffman, 825
F.2d 1430, 1440 (10th Cir. 1987), reVyd, 108 S.Ct. 2087 (1988).
76. See Huffman, supra note 15.
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tions alone will not revive the industry, restriction is the first necessary
step before revival will occur.
In deciding this case, the Court fundamentally changed the historic
relationship of the domestic uranium industry as a co-partner with the
government in the development of uranium resources. In effect, free
market forces, rather then Congress, will now determine if or when the
domestic producers re-enter the domestic market as viable competitors.
While both the legislative history and the stated purpose of the Atomic
Energy Act" seem to reinforce a national commitment to a strong domestic
uranium mining and milling capability, the present decision effectively
removes the government's guarantee of responsibility for the survivablity
of the industry.
BILL PAYNE
77. Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (1982), provides:
(a) the development, use, and control of atomic energy shall be directed so as to make
the maximum contribution to the general welfare, subject at all times to the paramount
objective of making the maximum contribution to the common defense and security;
and (b) the development, use, and control of atomic energy shall be directed so as to
promote world peace, improve the general welfare, increase the standard of living,
and strengthen free competition in private enterprise.
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